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Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City
of Brisbane: New Opportunities for
Municipalities to Avoid Referendum
in Land Use Decisions
In Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, the California
Court of Appeal held that a city ordinance which changed the zon-
ing of originally designated wildlife habitat to another location
within the proposed development was an administrative act and
therefore not subject to referendum. Although local citizens
groups had collected the requisite signatures to put the ordinance
on the ballot for repeal by referendum, the appellate court upheld
the lower court's decision ordering the city to desist from holding
the election on the issue. The appellate court, narrowly focusing
on the perceived intent and wording of a habitat conservation plan,
determined that because the plan had a provision for future modi-
fications, the ordinance which changed the zoning within the pro-
ject merely "'pursue[di a plan already adopted by the legislative
body" and, therefore, was administrative and exempt from repeal
by referendum. This Note explores the impact of the decision's
expansion of exemptions from the referendum process upon citi-
zens groups as well as the problems and potential for municipal
abuses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of citizens to effect land use lecisions through their
reserved powers of referendum and initiative has been a recent and
heated topic of debate.' Some commentators believe important land
1. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Christopher R. Kelly, The Law of the Land: Who
Should Make Planning Decisions?, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 4 (outlining basis of
referendum and initiative powers, impact on planning through the exercise of those pow-
ers, and questioning the value of allowing direct citizen participation in lahd use planning
through referendum and initiative). See also Cynthia L. Fountaine, Comment, Lousy
Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initia-
tive, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1988) (discussing potential shortfalls of allowing citizen
legislation by initiative including insufficient pre-enactment review and lack of signature
gathering integrity); Greg M. Salvato, Comment, New Limits on the California Initia-
tive: An Analysis and Critique, 19 Loy. LA. L. REv. 1045 (1986) (overview and critique
of initiative in California).
use decisions should be left to the expertise of professional planners. 2
Others believe land use decisions are more balanced and beneficial to
the community if citizens participate through the referendum and
initiative process.' Striking the proper balance between the involve-
ment of citizens and the expertise of the professional planner has
predominately fallen upon the judiciary.
The California Constitution reserves citizens the power of referen-
dum and initiative.4 The referendum power grants citizens the op-
portunity to repeal unpopular governmental land use decisions.
Conversely, the initiative power grants citizens the power to directly
enact land use legislation.5 However, these powers are not absolute.
Certain subtle yet important restrictions apply. One of the most im-
portant restrictions upon the use of the referendum is that only "leg-
islative"6 land use decisions are subject to repeal. "Administrative" 7
land use decisions, on the other hand, are exempt from repeal by the
citizenry." The primary purpose for exempting administrative deci-
sions from the referendum process is to ensure that governmental
functions do not become bogged down with time consuming and
costly referendums concerning basic governmental functions.9
2. Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Management by the Initi-
ative in California: Legal and Practical Issues, 21 URB. LAW. 491 (1989) (noting that
allowing citizens to enact land use legislation poses many problems including: land use
regulations that are less flexible and outlive their usefulness, failure to fairly balance
competing public interests, non-application of California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) provisions, and application of narrow simplistic solutions to multifaceted land
use problems). See also David G. Andersen, Comment, Urban Blight Meets Municipal
Manifest Destiny: Zoning at the Ballot Box, the Regional Welfare, and Transferable
Development Rights, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 519 (1991) (offering solution balancing munici-
pality zoning rights and citizen direct participation); Mark A. Nitikman, Note, Instant
Planning - Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 497
(1988) (using initiative to make land use decisions seriously flawed, especially in regard
to lack of environmental reporting requirements and scrutiny of initiatives themselves).
3. Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Pub-
lic Participation in Land Use Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by Initiative and
Referenda, 21 URS. LAW. 511 (1989). Freilich and Guemmer acknowledge referenda as
a "basic instrument of democratic government." Id. at 513 (quoting City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976)). They also assert that there are no
persuasive policy reasons to prevent public participation in land use policy and those
jurisdictions that do not allow public participation "essentially make a policy decision to
further a political ideology which elevates efficiency and expertise in government over
citizen participation." Id. at 514.
4. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text discussing the California constitu-
tional provisions for referenda and initiative.
6. Legislative decisions or acts have been defined as those which declare a public
purpose and make provisions for the ways and means of accomplishing that purpose,
McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 124, 203 P. 132, 136 (1921).
7. Administrative decisions or acts have been defined as those activities which are
necessary to carry out legislative policies already declared by the legislative body. Id.
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9. W.W. Dean & Assocs. v. City of South San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368,
1374, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (1987). "This legislative-administrative dichotomy reflects a
[VOL. 29: 561, 1992] Southwest Diversified
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Labeling a city land use decision as "legislative" or "administra-
tive" has a tremendous impact on the available avenues of action for
concerned local citizens. The judiciary has been given the important
task of setting the boundaries of what will be considered "legisla-
tive" and subject to referendum and what will be "administrative"
and exempt.
In Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane,10 the California
Court of Appeal unanimously held a city ordinance that changed the
zoning of a wildlife habitat to another location within a proposed
development was merely an administrative act not subject to referen-
dum. The court reasoned the zoning swap was simply a modification
provided for by a pre-existing habitat conservation agreement and
therefore was an administrative act." Although the wording of the
appellate court decision down-played the changes embodied in the
mere "modification" and represented the ordinance as a continuation
of a pre-existing legislative plan, the decision will allow a new oppor-
tunity for shrewd municipalities to avoid unwanted referendums in
land use decisions. If cities accept conservation or development
agreements with "flexible" terms for later "modifications," they will
be able to backdate their legislative decision to the initial agreement.
Later, when the terms of the proposed development are firmed up
and finalized, dramatic changes in the layouts of projects can be ac-
complished as "administrative" decisions exempt from public refer-
endum. As the range of what can be considered an "administrative"
decision expands, citizens' groups will be severely hampered in their
ability to actively participate in their communities' land use deci-
sions through referendum. By allowing municipalities to approve
"flexible" agreements which allow for dramatic future changes, the
citizens of a community are kept uninformed and unable to antici-
pate or exercise other political tools until proposed projects are close
to completion. This Note explores the background, legal decision,
and political problems created by the appellate court's decision in
Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane."2
determination to balance the ideal of direct legislation by the people against the practical
necessity of freeing municipal governments from time consuming and costly referenda on
merely administrative matters." Id. (quoting Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, 86 Cal. App.
3d 506, 509, 150 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327 (1978).
10. 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 280 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1991).
11. Id. at 1558, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying
text.
12. 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 280 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1991).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The power and use of referendum and initiative by citizens has
had a long and disparate history.13 Direct democracy, through refer-
endum and initiative, was originally used as a method for states to
adopt their own constitutions. 4 Later, these powers were used by
citizens to overcome legislative shortfalls and directly focus laws
upon those areas which interested citizens most.' 5 The specific uses
of referendum and initiative have mirrored the particular concerns of
the citizenry over the years and continues to reflect new public atti-
tudes and agendas as they develop.16
In California, the state constitution expressly reserves the power of
referendum and initiative to the people.' 7 The California Constitu-
tion defines the power of referendum as "the power of the electors to
approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes."18 Generally, the
courts have liberally construed the peoples' ability to exercise their
reserved powers of referendum.' The California Supreme Court has
13. See David L. Callies et al., Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative, Referendum and the
Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53, 55-63 (1991). See also William Kramer,
As Far Back as 1914 There Were Problems with 'People Power,' L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 14,
1987, at 4 (containing a colorful excerpt from the San Francisco Chronicle in 1914 la-
menting the "utter breakdown" of referendum and initiative as a practicable manner of
administering public affairs and noting initiatives were a "farce" and people had no de-
sire to govern themselves in general).
14. Callies et al., supra note 13, at 57-58.
15. Id. at 59, 60 (noting that citizen concerns such as women's suffrage, prohibi-
tion, civil rights, and environmental protection were addressed through initiative and
referendum).
16. Id. at 58-63. In the late nineteenth century the Progressive movement led to
state constitutional amendments providing citizens statutory guarantees of referendum
and initiative. Over time citizens used this power to enforce societal concerns. During the
turn of the century many initiatives and referenda addressed the problems of child labor,
women's suffrage, and prohibition. In the 1930s social welfare issues took center stage.
During the 1950s and 1960s civil rights and civil liberties were addressed through initia-
tive and referendum. Later in the 1970s and 1980s environmental issues stepped to the
forefront. Notwithstanding the subject matter, the overall numbers of initiatives in Cali-
fornia has also increased. Id. See also On the Initiative Glut. . . Major Reforms Needed
Quick, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 30, 1990, at 6 (citing excessive number of initiatives as harm-
ing direct democracy).
17. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is vested in the
California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve
to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.").
18. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9 (defining the scope of the peoples' referendum powers
and only exempting "urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing
for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the state" from referendum
recall).
19. Merriman v. Board of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 3d 889, 891, 188 Cal, Rptr.
343, 344 (1983) (allowing referendum, stating that "[tlhe People's reserved power of
referendum ... is to be liberally construed to uphold the power whenever it is reason-
able to do so" (citing Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (other
citation omitted)); Reagan v. City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 618, 628, 26 Cal. Rptr.
775, 781 (1962) (holding that policy of city to acquire specified waterfront properties
564
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held that if doubts exist regarding legislative interpretation, they
should be resolved in favor of allowing the people to exercise their
reserved powers.10
However, before the people may vote on an ordinance for recall,
certain procedural requirements must be met. To recall an ordinance
a local city council has passed, ordinance recall proponents must
gather petitions signed by ten percent of the city's registered vot-
ers.21 The petition must be completed and presented to the city coun-
cil within thirty days of the effective date of the ordinance.2 2 After
receipt of the petition the city council must suspend and reconsider
the ordinance.23 If the city council or legislative body does not com-
pletely repeal the ordinance, it must be submitted to the voters for a
decision. 24 The ordinance cannot become effective until a majority of
voters have approved it.
25
The constitutional limitations upon referendum powers are very
narrow. 26 In contrast, the judiciary has imposed more expansive re-
strictions on this reserved power. One of the most significant judicial
was a legislative act subject to referendum); Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d
650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967) (holding that issue must be placed on ballot unless court
can find compelling showing why it should interfere with election).
20. "If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power,
courts will preserve it." Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (quot-
ing Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563-64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1961)).
The court held that the growth control initiative which would limit growth until facilities
could be built to handle increased population was not unconstitutional, stating that the
relationship between the initiative and the public welfare need only be "fairly debata-
ble". Id. at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54. See generally Mervynne v.
Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1961) (direct democracy
through initiative is "one of the most precious rights of our democratic process").
21. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4051 (West Supp. 1992). For county referenda, as opposed
to city or municipal referenda, the citizens must gather 10% of the number of votes cast
in the county for governor in the last gubernatorial election. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3753
(West 1977).
22. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4051 (West Supp. 1992). For city or municipal referen-
dum 10% of all registered voters must sign; if a city has less than 1000 registered voters
then 25% or 100 voters (whichever is less) must sign the petition. Id.
23. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4051 (for city/municipal referenda); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
3753 (West 1977) (for county referenda). During this period the city clerk examines the
petition and certifies the results. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4054 (West Supp. 1992).
24. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4055 (for city/municipal referenda); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
3754 (for county referenda).
25. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3754, 4055. The city council is also prohibited from rein-
troducing an ordinance previously repealed by referendum for a period of one year after
the date of repeal by voters or city council. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4055.
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (listing three exemptions under con-
stitutional referendum powers). Also, under the Elections Code, referenda cannot be used
to reject ordinances calling for changes (improvement, opening, or closing) of city streets
restrictions upon the power of referendum is that the recall power
may only be exercised against "legislative" as opposed to "adminis-
trative" decisions.
2 7
In the arena of land use decisions, California courts have generally
adopted a system of "generic classifications" which determine
whether decisions are legislative or administrative based on their
subject matter.28 Under this approach, the courts have generally held
zoning, rezoning, and general plan adoptions and amendments to be
"legislative. ' 29 Alternatively, the approval of conditional use permits,
variances, and tentative subdivision maps are considered to be "ad-
ministrative."30 In supporting the categorical approach, the courts
have noted generic categories offer the advantages of economy, cer-
tainty, and avoidance of unnecessary litigation. 31 Although the ap-
pellate court in Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane
acknowledged the advantages of the categorical approach and at-
tempted to keep it intact, the decision is a significant departure from
the established methodology and deserves analysis.
III. SOUTHWEST DIVERSIFIED, INC. V. CITY OF BRISBANE
A. Facts of the Case
This case presents the story of a complex struggle between small
town residents attempting to maintain the character of their commu-
nity, developers proposing a large residential development, and two
species of butterflies3 2 inhabiting not only the proposed development
(including right-of-ways and grades) which are to be funded by special assessments on
real estate. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4061.
27. Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950) (stating that
the California Constitution applies "only to acts which are legislative in character, and
not to executive or administrative acts"). See also W.W. Dean & Assocs. v. City of
South San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1987) (upholding legis-
lative/administrative dichotomy).
28. Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 521-24, 620
P.2d 565, 571-73, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 910-12 (1980); Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561,
570, 685 P.2d 1152, 1157-58, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806-07 (1984). The categorical ap-
proach of California is fairly unique. Many other states focus on the substantive nature
of the specific provision as opposed to its label. Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 3, at
533.
29. Arnel Development, 28 Cal. 3d at 516, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907;
Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979);
W. W. Dean, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 1374-75, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
30. W.W. Dean, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 1374-75, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
31. Arnel Development, 28 Cal. 3d at 516, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
In Arnel Development, the court held the act of rezoning parcels owned by only three
individuals was a legislative act subject to initiative and that parcel size or number of
property owners were not the proper criteria to determine whether rezoning was legisla-
tive or administrative.
32. See, e.g., PETER STEINHART, CALIFORNIA'S VILD HERITAGE: THREATENED
AND ENDANGERED ANIMALS IN THE GOLDEN STATE 60 (1990) (photographs and descrip-
tions of endangered species in California, including the Mission Blue butterfly (Icaricia
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area, but also the Federal Endangered Species List.
In 1976, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USF&WS)
listed the Mission Blue butterfly as an endangered species. As a re-
sult of the listing, any proposed residential development on San
Bruno Mountain which would kill the butterflies would be halted. 33
San Bruno Mountain is located near the tip of the San Francisco
Peninsula. Although the mountain is surrounded by urban develop-
ment, it remains a viable habitat area for many rare species of plants
and animals. 4 The area of the mountain considered for development
was a 237 acre low-lying extension called the Northeast Ridge. The
ridge is ninety percent grassland and was an important butterfly
habitat. This area was eventually annexed by the City of Brisbane.
3 5
By the early 1970s, developers had purchased the entire mountain.
With the discovery of the endangered species on the mountain, two
thousand acres were eventually sold or donated to the county and
state. The balance of the land was held for development.3 In order
to create an acceptable plan for the mountain, the San Bruno Moun-
tain Steering Committee was formed. The Committee consisted of
all interested parties, including the City of Brisbane, the developers,
and the USF&WS.
In 1982, the Committee executed a Habitat Conservation Plan
agreement (HCP) to protect endangered species and possibly allow
limited development on the mountain.3 7 This agreement allowed for
icarioides missionensis) and San Bruno Elfin butterfly (Incisalia mossii bayensisi)). Au-
thor also notes positive impact of San Bruno HCP agreement on protecting butterflies'
habitat. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 7, Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of
Brisbane, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 280 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1991) (No. A049364).
34. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1550, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 870. The
mountain is one of the last remnants of an isolated and unique ecosystem. A 1982 biolog-
ical census found seven rare animal species and twenty-seven rare plant species inhab-
iting the mountain.
35. Id. at 1552, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The ridge area was estimated to contain 22
to 33% of the mountain's population of Mission Blue butterflies and 12 to 50% of the
Callippe Silverspot butterfly population. Although the Callippe Silverspot was never offi-
cially added to the endangered species list, all parties involved considered its habitat
requirements in their decision-making.
36. Id. at 1550, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 870. The original joint owners of the mountain
were Visitacion Associates and Crocker Land Co. After litigation with the County of San
Mateo, Visitacion sold in excess of 2,300 acres of its mountain property for over
$11,000,000.00. Visitacion owns the Northeast Ridge property. Southwest Diversified,
Inc. (a subsidiary of COSCAN, a multinational, publicly-traded corporation based in
Toronto, Canada) holds an option to purchase the ridge from Visitacion. Opening Brief
of Appellants at 6-8, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364); Appellant's Petition for Re-
hearing at 7, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
37. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 8-9, Southwest Diversified (No.
future development of some portions of the butterfly habitat and for
disruption and revegetation of an additional, small percentage of the
land. However, the HCP preserved eighty-one percent of the moun-
tain as open space/undisturbed habitat. 8 The HCP also provided for
habitat management programs of open spaces to be funded by the
developers and annual homeowner assessments."
In September 1982, Cadillac-Fairview Homes (the predecessor in
interest of Southwest Diversified, Inc.) prepared a specific plan for
the ridge. The specific plan included a proposal for 1250 condomini-
ums on 67.7 acres of the ridge. Cadillac-Fairview never received any
development approvals from the city and the project was ultimately
abandoned.40
In February 1983, the City of Brisbane adopted the Northeast
Ridge Specific Plan, approved the developers' tentative subdivision
map and enacted Ordinance No. 289.41 Ordinance No. 289 estab-
lished areas to be a "planned development" district and an "open
space" district for the conserved area. 42 The proposed new condo-
minium project would increase the population of Brisbane by fifty
percent.43
A049364). "[T]he objective of the plan is to conserve the species of concern with or
without development on SBM (San Bruno Mountain)." Id. The HCP also required de-
velopers to submit their plans to the appropriate local agency to follow "normal approval
procedures." Id. Amici curiae stressed the biological HCP was not a development agree-
ment. Id.
38. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal App. 3d at 1551-52, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
iThe proposed development area would destroy 14% of the Mission Blue habitat and 8 %
of the Callippe Silverspot habitat. The HCP also had several mitigation measures such as
drainage control, revegetation of native species, buffer zones, and phased construction to
lessen the overall potential impact.
39. Id. The funding for habitat management programs was a major selling point
by amici curiae in support of the developers. The amici noted $60,000 per year was
needed to carry out the HCP, and of that figure $50,000 would be paid by the developer
or homeowners. The amici argued "without the assurance of the continued availability of
these [developers' payments] . . . there would be a substantial risk the [conservation]
program would fail." Amicus Curiae Brief of County of San Mateo in Support of Appel-
lees Southwest Diversified, Inc., Visitacion Assoc. at 8-9, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364).
40. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 10, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364).
41. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1552, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 869. It is
unclear which developer's tentative subdivision map was approved-whether it was
Southwest Diversified or Visitacion Associates. However, it does seem clear that the ten-
tative subdivision map was not from Cadillac-Fairview. Appellant's Petition for Rehear-
ing states that Cadillac-Fairview had not completed a final master subdivision map or a
tentative subdivision map. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 10, Southwest Diversi-
fied (No. A049364) (citing City's Judicially Noticed Federal Court Answer § 27 at 7-8).
42. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1552, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
43. The dramatic population increase was of great concern to the Brisbane resi-
dents. Appellant's Reply to 'Joint Brief' at 21, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364)
(The proposed development would increase the current Brisbane population by fifty per-
cent. "A fifty percent change in population cannot be considered minor. The people
should be allowed to vote on this.").
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In 1985, as opposition to the development mounted, the city
adopted a new "housing element""' of its 1980 general plan.45 The
amendment would limit the number of housing units in the city and
attempt to preserve the "small town character" of Brisbane.
46
In response to the general plan amendment, the developers sued
the city and city council, claiming the amendment unconstitutionally
interfered with their vested right47 to develop the property. The suit
was ultimately settled and the City of Brisbane was named as the
prevailing party.48
During the period when the suit was still pending, the city and
developers entered into non-public negotiations. The negotiations
lasted three years and produced a settlement agreement based upon
a revised plan. The revised plan maintained the amount of property
to be developed at 92 acres, but reduced the number of units from
1250 condominium units to 579 mixed units including single family
homes.49 The revised plan also substantially changed the boundaries
44. A "housing element" is one of the mandatory elements of a general plan. This
element is a comprehensive assessment of the community's current and future housing
needs. It includes policy statements for providing adequate housing and programs to im-
plement the policy. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 65302(c), 65580-65589.8 (West 1987); see
also DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CALIFORNIA LAND-USE AND PLANNING LAW 9-11 (1990).
45. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 11, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364). A "general plan" is a long-term comprehensive plan for the physical develop-
ment of a city. The general plan sets forth the development policies for a city and must
contain a variety of mandatory elements which specifically outline the plan. The
mandatory elements are (a) land use element, (b) circulation element, (c) housing ele-
ment, (d) conservation element, (e) open space element, (f) noise element, and (g) safety
element. Other elements are optional. CURTIN, supra note 44, at 8-17.
46. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 11, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364).
47. A "vested right" refers to a developer's right to build a project if he has ob-
tained a building permit and has performed substantial work in good faith on the project
prior to the changes in a city's land use regulations affecting their project. Avco Commu-
nity Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 386, 389-90, 553 P.2d 546, 550 (1976).
48. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1553, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The
developers' suit alleged the city had reneged on an agreement for development (citing the
HCP agreement) and illegitimately exercised municipal authority. The developers re-
quested some city council members be personally liable and pay $100,000 in punitive
damages. The city answered explaining the HCP was a biological agreement and the city
preserved its "police power to regulate land use." Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at
11-12, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
49. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 15, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364); Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1553, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
There seems to be a direct conflict in the number of acreage involved in the negotiated
plan. The amici curiae contend, "The negotiated plan called for the residential develop-
ment area to be increased to 92 total acres from the original 67.7 acres." Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing at 15, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364) (citing 5 Record,
between the open space and the planned development. This change
consolidated the development downslope, closer to Brisbane.5
0
As part of the settlement plan with the developers, the city agreed
to act upon the developers' application of a vesting tentative subdivi-
sion map, related permits, and rezoning of the ridge to conform to
the revised development plan.51 The project was "fast-tracked"
through the public review process and on November 6, 1989, the city
council conditionally approved the new subdivision map. One week
later, the city council enacted Ordinance No. 351 which adjusted the
zoning boundaries of the area to conform to the new subdivision
map.
52
The citizens' group response was swift. Within one month of the
rezoning, they gathered the requisite number of signatures for a ref-
erendum on Ordinance No. 351. The city clerk verified the petition
and set an April 17, 1990 election date. 3
On December 29, 1989, Southwest Diversified filed for a writ of
mandate to block the election. The writ was opposed by a non-profit
organization, Bay Area Mountain Watch, and five local citizens. The
Superior Court granted the peremptory writ and ordered the city to
vacate their referendum election. Throughout the litigation, the City
of Brisbane had taken a neutral position.54 The citizens' group ap-
pealed and the case was reheard in the California Court of Appeal,
First District.
tbl. 25, at 1379). However, the appellate court decision states, "The revised plan called
for the development of the same total acres, 92 acres." Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal.
App. 3d at 1553, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
50. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1553, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The
revised plan also required the developers to fund certain impacted municipal facilities
which would add $18,323 in cost to each residential unit. Road layouts also changed.
Additionally, since the revised plan changed the area for development, an amendment to,
the permit under the Endangered Species Act was required. New biological studies were
undertaken, and the new plan was considered to be an improvement, biologically
speaking.
51. Id. at 1554, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The city was adamant about clarifying that
the developers were only assured that the city would guarantee a decision on the applica-
tion, not approval of the application. The city merely agreed to a decision by a specific
deadline. Petition for Rehearing, or, Alternatively, for Modification of Opinion at 2-3,
Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
52. Petition for Rehearing at 15-16, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364); South-
west Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1554, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
53. Petition for Rehearing at 16, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
54. Petition for Rehearing at 16-17, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364). The
city of Brisbane had been sensitive about the litigation involving San Bruno Mountain
and filed a separate modification request to ensure the published opinion reflected the
fact that the settlement with Southwest Diversified guaranteed the city would process the
developer's applications but not automatically approve them. Petition for Rehearing, or,
Alternatively, for Modification of Opinion at 2, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
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B. The Court's Opinion
Acting Presiding Justice Newsome delivered the unanimous opin-
ion. The court held that the ordinance, which rezoned the open space
and planned development, pursued a plan already adopted by a legis-
lative body and therefore was an administrative act not subject to
referendum.5
The court began its discussion by noting the issue in the case was
fairly narrow: whether the adjustment of "open space" and "planned
development" boundaries "to mitigate the environmental impact of
the development" was subject to referendum.56 The court expressly
noted that the citizens' group had not challenged the developers'
vesting tentative subdivision map or questioned the relocation of
roads or the changes in the residential unit mix.57 In doing so, the
court avoided the issue of whether the city changed the permitted
character of the development by a legislative decision.
After defining the parameters of the issue, the court traced the
basis of the referendum powers from the California Constitution
through case law, highlighting those cases which distinguished legis-
lative from administrative decisions.58 The court noted that accord-
ing to McKevitt v. City of Sacramento,59 legislative acts include
those acts which declare a public purpose and make provisions for
the "ways and means" of achieving that purpose. Administrative
acts were defined by the McKevitt court as those which are "neces-
sary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already
declared by the legislative body." 60 Citing a more recent treatise, the
Southwest Diversified court defined legislative acts as those which
proscribe a "new policy or plan," where administrative acts "merely
pursue a plan already adopted by the legislative body."'"
55. Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 280
Cal. Rptr. 869 (1991).
56. Id. at 1555, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (1991).
57. Id. (The residential unit mix was changed to include not only condominiums
but also single family residences.).
58. Id. at 1556, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (citing McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55
Cal. App. 117, 203 P. 132 (1921); Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, 86 Cal. App. 3d 506,
150 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1978)).
59. 55 Cal App. 117, 203 P. 132 (1921).
60. Id. at 124, 203 P. at 136.
61. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1555, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (citing
5 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.55, at 266 (3d ed.
1989)).
The court stated that the distinction between legislative and ad-
ministrative acts would turn on both legal and factual issues regard-
ing the legislative body's intent. That intent would be inferred from
the ordinances themselves, as well as related documents such as the
HCP agreement.62
To determine the intent of the city council, the court focused on
Article III of the HCP agreement which included a modification
clause allowing for boundary and map changes under the terms of
the agreement.63 The court also acknowledged another section of the
HCP agreement which provided procedures for amending the bound-
aries of the conserved habitat area.6 4 One of the amendment proce-
dures provided for the adjustment of boundaries through land
exchanges. Exchanges of habitat land for proposed development land
was permissible if the land traded was of equal biological value.65
The court determined Ordinance No. 351 would fall under the land
exchange provision of the HCP agreement.66
Examining Ordinance No. 289 (the original districting ordinance)
in light of the HCP agreement, the court determined the trial court
might reasonably have found the city had intended the boundaries to
be provisional, subject to future modification.67 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the modification pursued a plan already adopted by a leg-
islative body and was an administrative act not subject to
referendum. 8
The court bolstered their decision by drawing parallels to their re-
cent decision in W.W. Dean & Associates v. City of South San
62. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1556, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 873. In
their decision, the Southwest Diversified court relied very heavily on interpreting the
HCP agreement to support their finding of an administrative action. See infra notes 63-
68 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 1556-57, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74 (The provisions of Article III stated,
"It is recognized that the maps included within chapter VII of the HCP indicating the
boundaries of Conserved Habitat assume implementation of the HCP in light of existing
conditions and restrictions .. ., but that such maps, boundaries and conditions may be
modified or revised in accordance with this Agreement." (emphasis added)).
64. Id. at 1556, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
65. Id. The requirements for the biological land trade included that the exchange
occur within the same administrative parcel upon the written findings of the local juris-
diction that the land in fact was biologically equivalent.
66. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1556, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
67. Id. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text discussing court's interpreta-
tion as representative of new, more reserved trend in allowing referendum in local land
use decisions.
68. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1556, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (citing
MCQUILLIN, supra note 61, § 16.55, at 266).
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Francisco.69 The W. W. Dean case also involved a proposed develop-
ment on the flanks of San Bruno Mountain and changes to the devel-
opment plans pursuant to the HCP agreement.7 0 The proposed
changes in W. W. Dean were to allow for a higher amount of acreage
than was called for in the HCP agreement to be disrupted during
construction, then revegetated to its natural state.7  In W.W. Dean,
the court held the temporary changes were administrative in nature
and not subject to referendum.72 In the present decision, the court
acknowledged the factual distinctions between the Southwest Diver-
sified case and the W.W. Dean case, but stated it still supported the
theory that amendments to development plans pursuant to the HCP
agreement "may be regarded as merely carrying out a previously
adopted legislative policy."
'7 3
The court next addressed the appellant's argument regarding the
required use of "generic classifications" for land use decision deter-
mination. The court acknowledged the classification scheme had an
unbroken lineage of judicial support, as well as the merit of economy
of application. 4 However, the court did not feel compelled to follow
the precedent in this case. The court conceded that on the whole
"generic classifications" analysis was appropriate in land use deci-
sions, but noted this was a unique case." The court reasoned that,
unlike the California Supreme Court decision in Arnel Development
Co. v. City of Costa Mesa,"6 which upheld the generic classification
69. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1987). Appellees Southwest Diver-
sified also relied heavily on the parallels to the W.W. Dean decision to support their
arguments. See Amicus Curiae Brief of County of San Mateo in Support of Appellees
Southwest Diversified, Inc. and Visitacion Associates, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364).
70. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1556-57, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 874
(1991).
71. Id. (The purpose for amending the HCP in W.W. Dean was to mitigate against
landslide problems.).
72. Id. (The Southwest Diversified court noted the strong dissent of Justice White
in the decision of W.W. Dean that the Dean changes were administrative as opposed to
legislative.).
73. Id. at 1557, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (In noting the difference in the two cases
the court stated, "The decision differs from the present case in certain significant re-
spects-it sanctioned the disturbance of a substantial portion of conserved habitat and
involved the amendment of the HCP rather than a zoning ordinance.").
74. Id. (Among the cases cited for their precedential value were Yost v. Thomas,
36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d 1152, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984) and Associated Homebuilders
of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1976).).
75. Id. at 1558, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 875 ("We agree that such a simple generic
analysis is ordinarily appropriate in this field.").
76. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
model, this case dealt with a fact situation in which the legislative
body anticipated future boundary changes and provided procedures
for those changes.7 7 The court continued to distinguish the Arnel de-
cision, stating the Arnel court's concerns regarding the creation of
vague distinctions which would deprive cities of a clear and reliable
test to distinguish legislative and administrative acts were not pre-
sent in this case."8 The court believed their holding could be confined
to the unique circumstances of the case and would therefore not dis-
rupt the generic classification approach of Arnel.
7 9
The court next dismissed the appellant's final argument that the
election should have been held prior to the court hearing the appeal.
The court explained that although courts should generally decline to
hear constitutional challenges to referenda until after the, election,
the court was entitled to remove issues from ballots prior to elections
if the people did not have the power to vote on them originally. 80
Citing the California Supreme Court decision of Legislature v.
Deukmejian,"' the court stated it was well settled that courts may
remove referenda from ballots if the subject did not concern a legis-
lative matter.82
IV. ANALYSIS
Although Sbuthwest Diversified may initially appear to be very
fact-specific and of little impact, the decision is important for three
reasons. First, the decision may reflect a recent trend toward cur-
tailing and limiting public participation in land use decisions through
referendum and initiative. Second, the decision creates a significant
exception to the Arnel generic categorical approach in land use anal-
ysis. Finally, the decision allows municipalities to enter "flexible"
agreements permitting future modifications, even to zoning, to be ex-
empt from the censoring votes of the public. Without the ability to
anticipate or recall these flexible ordinances, citizens are unable to
77. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1558, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
78. Id.
Moreover, the considerations that prompted the Arnel court to adopt a categor-
ical rule are not present in the instant case. The [Arnel] court was concerned
that a rule treating minor zoning actions as administrative would call for vague
distinctions and deprive municipal governments of a "test which distinguishes
legislative from adjudicative acts with clarity and reasonable certainty."
Id.
79. Id. ("[W]e perceive no difficulty in confining our holding to the unique circum-
stances of the case. . . [and] we cast no doubt on the classification of zoning actions
generally as legislative in nature.").
80. Id. at 1558-59, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 875 ("There can no longer be any doubt that
the courts may remove a referendum from the ballot on the ground that it does not
concern a legislative measure.").
81. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
82. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1558, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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exercise one of their most "precious rights" 83 --that of direct democ-
racy through referendum.
A. Reflection of a Trend
Commentators have been acutely aware of the tensions and con-
flicts involved in allowing citizens to participate directly in establish-
ing and repealing land use legislation. 4 Although the courts have in
the past stated that any doubts about legislative intent should be
settled in favor of allowing the citizens to exercise their reserved
powers of referendum and initiative,85 the Southwest Diversified de-
cision seems to reflect a growing trend away from this presumption.
The Southwest Diversified court stated the trial court might have
found the city intended future modifications in the development zon-
ing and therefore interpreted the city's action as an administrative
decision.8 6 However, the court could have noted the ambiguity in the
city's intent and followed previous decisions enforcing the presump-
tion allowing referendum.87 The court's choice not to follow the pre-
sumption may reflect the changing attitude of the judiciary toward
the use of referendum in the land use arena. 8
83. Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 563, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (1961)
(direct democracy is "one of the most precious rights of our democratic process").
84. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Christopher R. Kelly, The Law of the Land: Who
Should Make Planning Decisions?, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 4 (questioning value
of public participation in land use decisions through referendum and initiative). See also
Cynthia L. Fountaine, Comment, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and
Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988). But see
Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Par-
ticipation in Land Use Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by Initiative and Refer-
enda, 21 URB. LAW. 511 (1989) (supports view that public participation through
referenda and initiative is appropriate in the land use arena).
85. Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976). See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
86. Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 1556,
280 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (1991) ("[T]he trial court might reasonably find that the munic-
ipality intended the boundaries to be provisional, subject to future adjustment in accor-
dance with the HCP Agreement. Under this interpretation, the revision of boundaries by
Ordinance No. 351 would fall within the accepted definition of an administrative act ...
.") (emphasis added).
87. The appellants in their petition for rehearing were also aware of the presump-
tion of allowing referendum and questioned whether it was error not to follow it. Appel-
lant's Petition for Rehearing at 22-23, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364).
88. See e.g. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CALIFORNIA LAND-UsE & PLANNING LAW
198-99 (1992). Author notes small but significant backlash against use of initiative in
land use planning. Also noted are recent decisions questioning amount of public expertise
and knowledge available in the subject area to be voted on (citing Taxpayers to Limit
Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d
The sole dissenter in the California Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict's decision in W.W. Dean & Associates v. City of South San
Francisco strongly acknowledged the presumption toward referen-
dum and noted the constitutional referendum power "is to be liber-
ally construed to uphold the power whenever it is reasonable to do
so."89 The two remaining justices were not swayed and again did not
allow the people to exercise their referendum powers.90 This new ad-
ministrative classification simply broadens the range of land use
cases in which the public is not allowed to participate.
B. Exception to Generic Classification Approach
In Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, the California
Supreme Court articulated the standard approach in deciding classi-
fications of legislative and administrative acts in the land use
arena. 91 The Arnel court stated that the generic classification
method, as opposed to the case-by-case method, was the standard.
2
The Arnel court noted that the use of generic classifications would
have many benefits. Those benefits included: overall economy and
predictability as to whether notice, hearings, or findings are neces-
sary and what form of judicial review is appropriate. 93 According to
the Arnel Court, straying away from these generic classifications
would substantially increase administrative costs, create great uncer-
tainty regarding application of referendum or initiative, and unduly
burden the courts with litigation to resolve these classification
issues. 94
In their prior decision of W. W. Dean, this court supported the ge-
neric classification approach. The court flatly stated that "zoning
and rezoning ordinances ... are legislative actions."95 In Southwest
1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990)) and changes in the Election Code (CAL. ELEC. CODE §
4009.5 authorizes city council to request reports to measure impact of initiative changes
on the community) to remedy some shortfalls. Although the author primarily notes
problems with the use of initiatives, judicial attitudes toward referendums in land use
decisions may parallel this view.
89. W.W. Dean & Assocs. v. City of South San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368,
1392, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11, 28 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
90. W.W. Dean, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Scott & Merrill, J.J.,
concurring).
91. Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565,
169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980). See supra notes 28-29, 74-76 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911 ("In summary, past Califor-
nia land-use cases have established generic classifications, viewing zoning ordinances as
legislative and other decisions, such as variances and subdivision map approvals, as
adjudicative.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 523, 620 P.2d at 572-73, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12.
95. W.W. Dean & Assoc. v. City of South San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368,
1374, 236 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (1987) (citing Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d
1152, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984); Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.
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Diversified, the court has broken away from its traditional standard
proscribing the rezoning of property to be a legislative act. It at-
tempts to mitigate the impact of the departure by stating:
Here, we perceive no difficulty in confining our holding to the unique cir-
cumstances of the case. By construing the revision of a zoning boundary
pursuant to a previously adopted procedure as an administrative action, we
cast no doubt on the classification of zoning actions generally as legislative
in nature.' 6
The problem with the creation of this administrative "sub cate-
gory" of rezoning is that it leaves the general public without a
benchmark to determine which modification agreements are signifi-
cant enough to create the administrative exception. The Southwest
Diversified court found the modification clause it relied upon in a
federally related HCP agreement. The HCP agreement was not a
development agreement like those typically relied upon by citizens.9
The general public looked to the words of Ordinance No. 351, which
called for the rezoning of property; it was well settled the rezoning of
property was legislative. Therefore, referendum would be allowed.
To allow the creation of a new "sub category" or exception to the
rezoning-of-property-as-legislative-action rule adds a layer of confu-
sion and detracts from the advantages of the generic classification
approach. Courts will become burdened with litigation regarding the
sufficiency, location, and notice of modification clauses. Citizens and
municipalities will be subject to greater uncertainty and confusion.
Finally, a new potentially confusing "sub category" exception will
hamper the goal of the Arnel court, which was to create a test distin-
guishing legislative and administrative acts "with clarity and reason-
able certainty." '98
3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980)).
96. Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 1558,
280 Cal. Rptr. 869, 875 (1991).
97. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364)
(citing 2 Record vol. 2, tbl. B, at 499-500).
98. Arnel Development Co., 28 Cal. 3d at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at
911 ("Yet without some test which distinguishes legislative from adjudicative acts with
clarity and reasonable certainty, municipal governments and voters will lack adequate
guidance in enacting and evaluating land-use decisions.").
C. Problems of "Flexible" Ordinances
and Modification Clauses
Allowing municipalities to use modification clauses, embodied in
documents other than the ordinance itself, to support an "adminis-
trative" decision creates problems for citizens' groups. First, the citi-
zens cannot anticipate which actual modifications will occur in the
future. By the time the modification/rezoning is determined, the de-
cision is deemed administrative and exempt from referendum recall.
Additionally, if the modification clauses can be embodied in docu-
ments other than the original ordinance, citizens monitoring legisla-
tive activity may believe the ordinances embody the final zoning, and
not research further. Citizens may be misled into believing they can
anticipate and respond to changes in their community, while un-
known major changes could be around the corner camouflaged as
"mere modifications" to an administrative design.
The Southwest Diversified case illustrates this point well. The
HCP agreement, which contained the modification clauses, was a bi-
ological plan for the area.99 Ordinance No. 289 was a separate docu-
ment which created the initial zoning districts for "open space" and
"planned development". 100 Local citizens who may have investigated
the proposed neighboring development would have seen the zoning
layout of the project as described in Ordinance No. 289 and would
have believed they could anticipate the ultimate layout of the adjoin-
ing project. Even if the citizens had been directed to the HCP agree-
ment, an insignificant clause regarding potential modifications would
not have alerted them to the possibility or probability of future mas-
sive changes. Based upon the apparent zoning of the neighboring
parcel, citizens believed they understood what development to expect
in their community. Not until Ordinance No. 351 was passed did the
citizens know of the major zoning changes in the neighboring devel-
opment. Only when the true impact of the proposed development had
been made clear did the citizens become aware and sufficiently con-
cerned to rally and propose a referendum.
Citizens can only react to zoning decisions of which they have firm
knowledge. The Brisbane citizens acted quickly, gathering signatures
as soon the true nature of the development was determined. 10 1 The
99. Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 1552,
280 Cal. Rptr. 869, 871 (1991); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Appel-
lant's Petition for Rehearing at 10, Southwest Diversified (No. A049364) (citing 2 Rec-
ord, tbl. B, at 499-500).
100. Southwest Diversified, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1552, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 871; see
supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
101. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 16, Southwest Diversified (No.
A049364) ("Shortly after the rezoning, the citizens' group gathered the requisite number
of signatures for a referendum petition putting Ordinance No. 351 to a vote.").
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court, however, did not allow the referendum, implying the citizens
somehow could have anticipated the radical changes. This case illus-
trates how "flexible" agreements and ordinances keep citizens unin-
formed and immobilized until, under this court's decision, it is too
late.
The Southwest Diversified decision also provides incentives for
municipalities to introduce or add modification clauses to any land
use agreement. In this manner, municipalities can invoke clauses im-
plementing major changes as "modifications," knowing citizens will
be barred from repealing the changes by referendum. Allowing these
clauses to function in this manner not only cuts out citizen participa-
tion from the land use loop,102 but also adds another level of poten-
tial non-disclosure or deception by municipalities.
V. CONCLUSION
Although controversies exist regarding how much the public
should directly participate in land use decisions, courts in the past
have generally resolved legislative intent issues in favor of allowing
referendum and initiative.'03
In Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, the California
Court of Appeal seems to backtrack from the judicial presumption
of allowing direct public participation in the land use arena. The
court attempts to focus on the "unique character" of the case to de-
flect any potential criticism regarding its departure from the estab-
lished tradition of favoring public involvement in local government.
Substantively, the decision also creates a new exception or "sub
category" to the established doctrine of using "generic classifica-
tions" in determining legislative intent for purposes of allowing ref-
erendum. In addition to creating this categorical exception, the
decision creates incentives for municipalities to include modification
clauses in their land use agreements. Allowing "flexible" ordinances
keeps the public uninformed and immobilized from action until
projects are closer to being finalized and citizens may be barred from
referendum.
Citizens can offer important input and balance to local land use
102. See generally Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer, Removing Artificial
Barriers to Public Participation in Land Use Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by
Initiative and Referenda, 21 URB. LAW. 511 (1989) (article supports theory that land
use decisions should be made with strong citizen involvement via referendum and
initiative).
103. See supra notes 1-3, 19-20 and accompanying text.
decisions. As residents of the community, they have strong incentives
to participate and make prudent decisions that will intimately effect
their quality of life. 04 The citizens of Brisbane were denied the op-
portunity to participate in their community's development by exer-
cising their right of referendum. Other citizens should not have to
suffer the same fate. The California Supreme Court should reaffirm
the importance of public participation through referendum and initi-
ative in the local land use arena.
CINDY Y. DOBLER
104. Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 102, at 556 (noting that the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of public participation in land use deci-
sions and has stated, "[N]o more important local government power and responsibility to
the people exists than the determination of land-use governance and planning for the
future of the community." (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
72 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986))).
